My idea is that the agent is the particle itself, and the laws of physics are simply the statistics of what decisions it tends to make. I imagine that if a fundamental particle like an electron was phenomenally conscious and had some kind of agency, it wouldn’t have any intention or self-awareness, so it would decide practically randomly, based on its quantum state, which would be some kind of rudimentary experience it has.
The reason is trying to work towards a model which could actually solve the hard problem, something which the physicalism prevalent in science has failed at completely. Consciousness is a fundamental aspect of reality, and it needs to be taken seriously, any model which doesn’t include it is either inacurrate or incomplete. Yes, a single particle might act randomly, but that might not hold for a more complex entangled system, especially an orchestrated one inside a living being.
There is no “hard problem.” It’s made up. Nagel’s paper that Chalmers bases all his premises on is just awful and assumes for no reason at all that physical reality is something that exists entirely independently of one’s point of view within it, never justifies this bizarre claim and builds all of his arguments on top of it which then Chalmers cites as if they’re proven. “Consciousness” as Chalmers defines it doesn’t even exist and is just a fiction.
My line of thought is this: the most epistemically primary thing is subjective experience, because it can be known directly, thus it is undeniably real. Due to the principle of ontological parsimony, if everything can be explained in terms of experience, there is no reason to postulate something beyond it (the physical). So the way I would formulate the hard problem would be something more like “Why does our experience contain the appearance of a physical world at all, and how are they related?”.
I guess this might not resonate with you either, if you don’t believe in phenomenal consciousness as all. Personally I have a hard time understanding physicalist reductionism, how can you say that something like the experience of redness is the same thing as some pattern of neurons firing in the brain? These are clearly very different things, and even if one is entirely dependent on the other, it doesn’t mean it’s non-existent or illusory.
There’s no such thing as “subjective experience,” again the argument for this is derived from a claim that reality is entirely independent of one’s point of view within it, which is just a wild claim and absolutely wrong. Our experience doesn’t “contain” the physical world, experience is just a synonym for observation, and the physical sciences are driven entirely by observation, i.e. what we observe is the physical world. I also never claimed “the experience of redness is the same thing as some pattern of neurons firing in the brain,” no idea where you are getting that from. Don’t know why you are singling out “redness” either. What about the experience of a cat vs an actual cat?
What I mean by subjective experience is what you might refer to as what reality looks like from a specific viewpoint or what it appears like when observed. I’m not sure whether you’re assuming a physicalist or idealist position when you say “what we observe is the physical world”. My issue with this is that observation usually implies the existence of something which is being observed, the appearance upon observation, and possibly also an observer.
If you claim that the physical world doesn’t exist independently of observation, and is thus nothing beyond the totality of observed appearances (seems to me like a form of idealism), then what is being observed? If there is no object being observed, and the fact it it apparent from multiple perspectives is simply a consequence of the coherence of observation, where do the qualities of those appearances originate from? How come things don’t cease to exist when they’re not being observed?
If you claim that the appearances don’t exist independently of the physical world being observed (the physicalist interpretation), why does the world appear different from different perspectives? How do you explain things like hallucinations (there is no physical object being observed, but still some appearance is present)?
The reason I brought up that example is because physicalists usually deny the existence of qualia and claim they’re nothing beyond the brain processes correlated with them.
What I mean by subjective experience is what you might refer to as what reality looks like from a specific viewpoint or what it appears like when observed.
So… reality? Why are you calling reality subjective? Yes, you have a viewpoint within reality, but that’s because reality is relative. It’s nothing inherent to conscious subjects. There is no such thing as a viewpoint-less reality. Go make a game in Unity and try to populate the game with objects without ever assigning coordinates to any of the objects or speeds to any of the object’s motion, and see how far you can go… you can’t, you won’t be able to populate the game with objects at all. You have to choose a coordinate system in order to populate the world with anything at all, and those coordinates are arbitrary based on an arbitrarily chosen viewpoint. Without picking a viewpoint, it is impossible to assign objects the majority of their properties.
If you claim that the physical world doesn’t exist independently of observation, and is thus nothing beyond the totality of observed appearances
No such thing as “appearances.” As Kant himself said: “though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears,” i.e. speaking of “appearances” makes no sense unless you believe there also exists an unobserved thing that is the cause of the appearances.
But there is neither an unobserved thing causing the appearances, nor is what we observe an appearance. What we observe just is reality. We don’t observe the “appearance” of objects. We observe objects.
If there is no object being observed
Opposite of what I said.
and the fact it it apparent from multiple perspectives is simply a consequence of the coherence of observation
What we call the object is certain symmetries that are maintained over different perspectives, but there is no object independently of the perspectives.
where do the qualities of those appearances originate from? How come things don’t cease to exist when they’re not being observed?
They cease to exist in one viewpoint but they continue to exist in others, and symmetries allow you to predict when/how those objects may return to your own viewpoint.
If you claim that the appearances don’t exist independently of the physical world being observed
I am claiming appearances don’t exist at all.
why does the world appear different from different perspectives?
Reality is just perspectival. It just is what it is.
How do you explain things like hallucinations (there is no physical object being observed, but still some appearance is present)?
If they perceive a hallucinated tree and believe it is the same as a non-hallucinated tree, this is a failure of interpretation, not of “appearance.” They still indeed perceived something and that something is real, it reflects something real in the physical world. If they correctly interpret it as a different category of objects than a non-hallucinated tree then there is no issue.
My idea is that the agent is the particle itself, and the laws of physics are simply the statistics of what decisions it tends to make. I imagine that if a fundamental particle like an electron was phenomenally conscious and had some kind of agency, it wouldn’t have any intention or self-awareness, so it would decide practically randomly, based on its quantum state, which would be some kind of rudimentary experience it has.
I feel like this is no different practically speaking than just saying its behavior is random, but anthropomorphizing it for some reason.
The reason is trying to work towards a model which could actually solve the hard problem, something which the physicalism prevalent in science has failed at completely. Consciousness is a fundamental aspect of reality, and it needs to be taken seriously, any model which doesn’t include it is either inacurrate or incomplete. Yes, a single particle might act randomly, but that might not hold for a more complex entangled system, especially an orchestrated one inside a living being.
There is no “hard problem.” It’s made up. Nagel’s paper that Chalmers bases all his premises on is just awful and assumes for no reason at all that physical reality is something that exists entirely independently of one’s point of view within it, never justifies this bizarre claim and builds all of his arguments on top of it which then Chalmers cites as if they’re proven. “Consciousness” as Chalmers defines it doesn’t even exist and is just a fiction.
My line of thought is this: the most epistemically primary thing is subjective experience, because it can be known directly, thus it is undeniably real. Due to the principle of ontological parsimony, if everything can be explained in terms of experience, there is no reason to postulate something beyond it (the physical). So the way I would formulate the hard problem would be something more like “Why does our experience contain the appearance of a physical world at all, and how are they related?”.
I guess this might not resonate with you either, if you don’t believe in phenomenal consciousness as all. Personally I have a hard time understanding physicalist reductionism, how can you say that something like the experience of redness is the same thing as some pattern of neurons firing in the brain? These are clearly very different things, and even if one is entirely dependent on the other, it doesn’t mean it’s non-existent or illusory.
There’s no such thing as “subjective experience,” again the argument for this is derived from a claim that reality is entirely independent of one’s point of view within it, which is just a wild claim and absolutely wrong. Our experience doesn’t “contain” the physical world, experience is just a synonym for observation, and the physical sciences are driven entirely by observation, i.e. what we observe is the physical world. I also never claimed “the experience of redness is the same thing as some pattern of neurons firing in the brain,” no idea where you are getting that from. Don’t know why you are singling out “redness” either. What about the experience of a cat vs an actual cat?
What I mean by subjective experience is what you might refer to as what reality looks like from a specific viewpoint or what it appears like when observed. I’m not sure whether you’re assuming a physicalist or idealist position when you say “what we observe is the physical world”. My issue with this is that observation usually implies the existence of something which is being observed, the appearance upon observation, and possibly also an observer.
If you claim that the physical world doesn’t exist independently of observation, and is thus nothing beyond the totality of observed appearances (seems to me like a form of idealism), then what is being observed? If there is no object being observed, and the fact it it apparent from multiple perspectives is simply a consequence of the coherence of observation, where do the qualities of those appearances originate from? How come things don’t cease to exist when they’re not being observed?
If you claim that the appearances don’t exist independently of the physical world being observed (the physicalist interpretation), why does the world appear different from different perspectives? How do you explain things like hallucinations (there is no physical object being observed, but still some appearance is present)?
The reason I brought up that example is because physicalists usually deny the existence of qualia and claim they’re nothing beyond the brain processes correlated with them.
So… reality? Why are you calling reality subjective? Yes, you have a viewpoint within reality, but that’s because reality is relative. It’s nothing inherent to conscious subjects. There is no such thing as a viewpoint-less reality. Go make a game in Unity and try to populate the game with objects without ever assigning coordinates to any of the objects or speeds to any of the object’s motion, and see how far you can go… you can’t, you won’t be able to populate the game with objects at all. You have to choose a coordinate system in order to populate the world with anything at all, and those coordinates are arbitrary based on an arbitrarily chosen viewpoint. Without picking a viewpoint, it is impossible to assign objects the majority of their properties.
No such thing as “appearances.” As Kant himself said: “though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears,” i.e. speaking of “appearances” makes no sense unless you believe there also exists an unobserved thing that is the cause of the appearances.
But there is neither an unobserved thing causing the appearances, nor is what we observe an appearance. What we observe just is reality. We don’t observe the “appearance” of objects. We observe objects.
Opposite of what I said.
What we call the object is certain symmetries that are maintained over different perspectives, but there is no object independently of the perspectives.
They cease to exist in one viewpoint but they continue to exist in others, and symmetries allow you to predict when/how those objects may return to your own viewpoint.
I am claiming appearances don’t exist at all.
Reality is just perspectival. It just is what it is.
If they perceive a hallucinated tree and believe it is the same as a non-hallucinated tree, this is a failure of interpretation, not of “appearance.” They still indeed perceived something and that something is real, it reflects something real in the physical world. If they correctly interpret it as a different category of objects than a non-hallucinated tree then there is no issue.